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CHAPTER 8 
Corporations and Partnerships 
RICHARD M. GABERMAN 
§8.1. Stock transfer restriction: Private stockholder agreement. A 
complete and absolute restriction against transfer of corporate stock 
has always been invalid as an improper restraint on alienation.1 Where 
the restriction, however, is a means of securing corporate control to 
those who developed and operated the corporation, the purpose is not 
"palpably unreasonable." The Supreme Judicial Court in Colbert v. 
Hennessey2 thus upheld a tripartite agreement which created the re-
striction. In quoting Chief Justice Holmes that "there seems to be no 
greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's associates 
in a corporation than in a firm,"3 the Court added that effect should 
be given to "agreements among stockholders in a close corporation 
just as effect is given to provisions for corporate consent or first op-
tions in articles of association or by-Iaws."4 
The appellant contended that the agreement did create a complete 
and absolute restraint.5 As opposed to the commonly used "first op-
RICHARD M. GABERMAN is associated with Moynahan, Novak, Cohen & Fitzgerald, 
Springfield. 
§8.l. 1 See, e.g., 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 360-362, 194 N.E. 
303, 305-306 (1935); Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 408, 106 N.E. 1012, 1013 
(1914). Both decisions are discussed in the text supported by notes 8-10 infra. 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997, 217 N.E.2d 914. This decision also involved the removal 
of a fiduciary (executor) because of partiality and conflict of interest in his role 
as executor and as director. Additional aspects of this decision are discussed in 
other sections of this chapter. The basic facts of this case are as follows: Loew 
loaned money to the corporation and received as security a mortgage, notes in-
dorsed by Bowser, 25 per cent of the outstanding stock and a pledge of Bowser's 
stock (a 35 per cent interest). A voting trust agreement was also executed. The cor-
porate by-laws and the trust agreement both contained a stock transfer restriction 
granting the corporation a first option. Years later Bowser and two other minority 
stockholders entered into a private agreement requiring their unanimous consent 
for any transfer. Bowser died leaving his stock to his relatives who subsequently 
assigned their legacy to Loew. Loew argued the invalidity of the private agree-
ment and the validity of the by-law restriction and the pledge. 
3 Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902). This case involved 
a "first option" restriction adopted in the by·laws and printed on each stock 
certificate. Similar provisions have been upheld in Kentucky Package Store, Inc. 
v. Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 117 N.E.2d 139 (1954); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 
v. American Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, III N.E.2d 447 (1953). 
41966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997, 1003, 217 N.E.2d 914, 920. 
5 The agreement, according to the reported facts, provided that no one of the 
parties or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns could transfer or sell 
his stock without the consent of the other parties. 
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tion" provision in articles of organization whereby the stock may be 
transferred if the corporation declines to purchase it,6 the agreement, 
in effect, precluded the estate of the deceased stockholder (and party to 
the agreement) from selling or transferring the stock without consent 
of the other parties. The appellant emphasized that the stock could be 
frozen in the estate, leaving little value.7 
The Colbert decision, involving a private stockholder agreement, 
is one of first impression for the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court 
in effect held that its prior decisions pertaining to stock transfer re-
strictions were not distinguishable but directly applicable. For ex-
ample, 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohiers was cited by the Court. This case 
involved a non-corporate agreement. A 99-year lease for a cooperative 
apartment prohibited the transfer of the cooperative stock without 
consent of the board of directors. Unlike Colbert, however, this re-
striction was also contained in the corporate by-laws and printed on 
the stock certificates. In finding the restriction not palpably unrea-
sonable, the Court emphasized that the prohibition was limited to 
the stockholder's lifetime, again unlike the Colbert case. 
Longyear v. Hardman9 was argued by both sides and cited by the 
Court in its opinion. In that case the agreement of association pro-
hibited transfer without the consent of three fourths of the capital 
stock. While it was an "indefinite" restraint, the Court found no ob-
jection. Unlike Colbert, in Longyear the restriction was created via 
the formal corporate process: 
The insertion of the restriction upon the right of transfer of the 
shares of stock in the agreement of association, the initial act in 
the organization of the company upon which depends all that 
comes after, is a limitation upon the corporation. It becomes a 
part of its being and enters into each share of stock as a part 
of its essence. The corporation comes into existence with this 
inherent qualifying restraint. It is agreed to by all the original 
incorporators who in respect of determining the nature of the 
corporation speak for future stockholders. It must be approved 
by the commissioner . . . before the charter can issue. A copy of 
it is a public record .... The certificate of stock contains [a] 
reference .... 10 
Because of these distinctions, the Supreme Judicial Court has implied 
that a private stockholder agreement will be tested with the same 
standards of reasonableness as utilized in corporate-adopted restric-
6 See note 3 supra. 
7 The Court's response to this point is apparently reflected in its statement that 
the agreement enabled the estate to sell the stock at a higher price. The block 
sale carried voting control. As assignee of the residuary interest, the appellant 
Loew's own position was enhanced, but not as a stockholder. 
S 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935). 
9219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914). 
10Id. at 409, 106 N.E. at 1014. 
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tions. Certainly Chief Justice Holmes was correct to a point when he 
stated that stock "creates a personal relationship analogous otherwise 
than technically to a partnership."ll However, incorporation naturally 
involves certain sacrifices of freedom of action. Is it not reasonable 
that the private agreement be strictly construed, especially when ex-
ecuted subsequent to the time of incorporation? Should it not at least 
be analyzed to determine whether it serves the legitimate purposes of 
the individual? The emphasis in Longyear was on whether it served 
corporate purposes. 
The Colbert opinion did not mention whether the certificates 
covered by the agreement contained a notice of the restriction. Massa-
chusetts statutes provide that no restriction is enforceable unless at 
least the existence of the restriction is prominently noted on the cer-
tificate.12 There is an exception, however, when one has knowledge 
of the restriction, which was apparently the case in Colbert. 13 In ad-
dition, the non-corporate aspect of the restriction in Colbert is itself 
an exception. General Laws, Chapter 106, Section 8-204, applies only 
to restrictions imposed by the "issuer," i.e., the corporation. And Chap-
ter 156B, Section 27(b), applies only to restrictions imposed by the 
articles of organization, by-laws, or agreements to which the corpora-
tion is a party. Unless the Court resorts to the principle of estoppel,14 
the limited application of these statutory provisions is a more com-
pelling reason for closer scrutiny of private agreements by using a 
more restrictive standard of reasonableness. 
§8.2. Ultra vires: Corporate purchase of voting trust certificates. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, 
Inc.,1 prohibited the use of corporate funds for the non-corporate 
purpose of establishing a voting trust designed to perpetuate in office 
the incumbent management. However, in Colbert v. Hennessey,2 the 
Court held that the corporate purchase of voting trust certificates 
would "not contravene the principle" of the Sagalyn decision. The 
purpose of the restriction granting the corporation the option to pur-
chase, whether applied to the trust certificates or the stock shares, was 
the same, i.e., "control entry into the corporation by outsiders." 
It is difficult to reconcile the two decisions. By exercising the option 
upon a proposed transfer, is the corporation buying just voting trust 
certificates or also redeeming the underlying stock? Is the stock re-
11 Barrett v. King, lSI Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902). 
12 See G.L., c. 155, §40 (repealed effective Oct. I, 1955). See G.L., c. 106, §S-204; 
c. 156B, §27, for presently effective law. 
13 G.L., c. 106, §S·204, comment 1. 
14 Cf. Baker v. Davie, 211 Mass. 429, 97 N.E. 1094 (1912). 
§S.2. 1290 Mass. 434, 195 N.E. 769 (1935). 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997, 217 N.E.2d 914, also noted in §S.I supra. Challenges to 
the use of voting trusts have been generally unsuccessful in Massachusetts. See Abbot 
v. Waltham Watch Co., 260 Mass. SI, 91, 156 N.E. S97, 901 (1927); BulIivant v. 
First National Bank of Boston, 246 Mass. 324, 333, 141 N.E. 41, 44 (1923); Bright-
man v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N.E. S09 (1900). 
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deemed as treasury stock; is it cancelled? Regardless of the answers, 
the corporation cannot "directly or indirectly" vote the stock.3 There-
fore, the corporation cannot indirectly vote upon its stock through 
trustees who hold such stock for the benefit of the corporation.4 Is 
the Supreme Judicial Court holding in Colbert that in purchasing the 
certificates, the corporation also redeemed the stock? An affirmative 
answer would seemingly run contrary to the general intent of the trust 
since redemption would result in less voting power. The voting trust 
is typically "an agreement among stockholders ... to make their power 
felt through combination" of voting strength.5 
However, in order for the Sagalyn and Colbert decisions to be con-
sistent, the Court must be in effect so holding. Otherwise the corpora-
tion would become a party to the voting trust which would be con-
sidered objectionable under the Sagalyn decision and would then vio-
late the statutory prohibition against indirect voting.6 But, as 
mentioned, redemption would certainly upset the delicate voting 
balance created by such trusts. It would seem that this result was 
not contemplated when the trust agreement expressly imposed the 
same restrictions on transfer imposed by the articles and by-Iaws.7 
§8.3. Voting trusts: Power to sell corporate assets. The Supreme 
Judicial Court recognized in Massa v. Stone1 that the protection of 
creditors is a legitimate reason for the creation of a voting trust. It is 
the means whereby creditors are assured of "unity and continuity in 
corporate management policy while [their] ... indebtedness exists."2 In 
Massa the trust was created at the direction of the creditor who con-
tinuously lent money to the corporation. For years two of the trustees 
managed the corporation in accordance with his instructions; the third 
trustee was generally ignored or outvoted. The Court recognized that 
3 G.L., c. 156, §31: "No corporation shall, directly or indirectly, vote upon any 
share of its own stock." G.L., c. 156B, §40, is similar. 
4 See Tapper v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 235 Mass. 209, 219, 126 N.E. 464, 
468 (1920). 
5 Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard &: Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434, 440, 195 N.E. 769, 
772 (1935). 
6 G.L., c. 156, §31. 
7 Because of this provision in the voting trust agreement, the Court did not 
have to answer the following question: In the absence of a provision in the articles 
of organization or by-laws making the stock transfer restriction specifically applic-
able to voting trust certificates, will the certificates nevertheless be SUbject to the 
restriction? The agreement stated: "[T]he transfer of said Voting Trust Certifi-
cates shall be subject to the same restrictions imposed upon the shares of the 
Common Stock . . . as provided in its Articles . . . and By-laws with the same 
force and effect as though the same were included as a condition and agreement 
herein." 
§8.3. 1346 Mass. 67, 190 N.E.2d 217 (1963). This case is reported in 1963 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §5.2, wherein the author raised and discussed the issue of whether 
the principles affecting voting trusts should be based on trust law or corporate 
law. He concluded that the Court followed the former but had failed to resolve 
this issue. 
2346 Mass. 67, 74, 190 N.E.2d 217, 222 (1963). 
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any voting trustee appointed to serve the interests of a creditor may 
vote so as to guard the creditor's interests. In doing so, however, he 
must act reasonably and not favor his or the creditor's interest to the 
detriment of the corporation or the beneficiaries.s The Court found 
that removal of one of the trustees was justified as his actions went 
beyond the proper protection of the creditor. 
The Court had another occasion to examine this decision in the 1966 
SURVEY year case, Stone v. Massa.4 This time the sale of the corporate 
assets approved by the two trustees was under attack by a bill in equity 
for declaratory relief. The trustees argued that the sale was proper 
since it was the only way in which to pay the corporate indebtedness. 
In rejecting this contention, the Court stated that the principal pur-
pose of the sale was to exclude the other stockholders from any benefit 
in the business and not to meet the creditor's demand for payment. 
The opinion, however, is not clear. The Court appears to be holding 
that the trustees must vote under such circumstances with an impartial 
and neutral attitude, i.e., not outweigh the creditor's interests. But 
then it stated an arm's length transaction is not required. It also added 
that the trustees could not weigh the facts fairly since the creditor, in 
effect, was making their decisions. The Court seemed to be approach-
ing the position that those in control of a corporation (the creditor 
"asserted control of 'fundamental management decisions' ") owe a 
fiduciary responsibility to the minority; however, it neither stated this 
nor alluded to related principles.6 Had the Supreme Judicial Court 
reached such a result, Stone v. Massa would have been extremely sig-
nificant. It would have, in effect, imposed fiduciary obligations upon 
an individual who dominated the corporate management. While 
the Court has been reluctant to impose such obligations on stock-
holders inter se,6 it has taken a progressive attitude toward the 
doctrine of "corporate opportunity." The basis of this doctrine is the 
recognition of the fiduciary nature of a director's duty to the corpora-
tion. Its application prevents a director from gaining personal benefit 
from a business opportunity that in fairness should be made available 
to the corporation. It effectively resolves any possible conflict of in-
terest in favor of the corporation. 
In Durfee v. Durfee &- Canning, Inc.7 the Court approved the state-
3 Ibid. 
41966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1141, 218 N.E.2d 583. This controversy was also involved 
in Bennett v. Florence, 347 Mass. 707, 200 N.E.2d 291 (1964); Bennett v. Superior 
Court, 347 Mass. 783, 199 N.E.2d 914 (1964). 
6 It has long been contended in commentaries and held by some courts that a 
majority stockholder owes a duty of good faith to the corporation and the other 
stockholders. See, e.g., Berle, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust," 44 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1049 (1931); Rohrlich, "Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders as a 
Means of Corporate Control," 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 692 (1933). See also Taylor v. 
Standard Gas &: Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307,59 Sup. Ct. 543, 83 L. Ed. 669 (1939). 
6 See e.g., Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 380, 30 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1940), and 
cases cited therein. 
7323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948). 
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ment in Ballentine that "the true basis of the doctrine should not be 
found in any expectancy or property interest concept, but in the un-
fairness on the particular facts of a fiduciary taking advantage of an 
opportunity when the interests of the corporation justly call for pro-
tection. This calls for the application of ethical standards of what is 
fair and equitable to particular sets of facts."8 The defendant was thus 
ordered to pay the corporation his profits from selling gasoline to the 
corporation which had not been financially able to purchase gasoline 
directly; he was liable as a constructive trustee of the profits.9 The 
implication in Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant,10 that the doctrine was 
limited to those situations in which the corporation had a pre-existing 
right in the opportunity or in which it had an expectancy growing 
out of an existing right, was repudiated. 
Before discussing the conduct of the trustees in selling the assets in 
Stone v. Massa, the Court had to consider whether voting trustees had 
the power to sell the corporate assets. In finding this power it cited 
Bullivant v. First National. Bank at Boston,u wherein tne Court had 
held that the trustees could vote in favor of a proposed plan of re-
organization. Quoting persuasive authority, the respondent (in the bill 
for declaratory relief) argued that the trust agreement would have 
provided for such powers if intended. The Ohio Supreme Court has 
stated that while a voting trust "agreement might grant specific au-
thority for sale by the trustees here, the grant of 'full power' to vote 
the stock for a limited time is clearly inconsistent with a power to 
destroy the beneficial ownership [retained by the stockholder] by 
sale."12 Using basic contract rules of construction, it would seem that 
8 Ballentine, Corporations 204 (rev. ed. 1946), cited at 323 Mass. 187, 199, 80 
N.E.2d 522,529 (1948). It is interesting to note that in Stone v. Massa the Court did 
in effect consider the fairness of the sale of assets. While the sale was improper 
the Court did not set it aside. Most of the corporate assets had been destroyed 
before the sale, and the present assets were in a very great part created by efforts 
made since the sale. (The profits, however, had been growing during the several 
years preceding the sale.) 
9 In a net profit situation, there is a difference between imposition of a con-
structive trust and an equitable lien to secure the restoration of misappropriated 
assets. See Black v. Parker Mfg. Co., 329 Mass. 105, 106 N.E.2d 544 (1952); Loring 
v. Baker, 329 Mass. 63, 106 N.E.2d 434 (1952). See also Peairs, Business Corpora-
tions §214 n.90 (Mass. Prac. Series, 1966 Supp.). 
10309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941). For more recent examples of the pro-
gressive attitude reflected in the Durfee decision, see W.H. Elliott & Sons Co. 
v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1962); Wilson v. Jennings, 344 Mass. 608, 184 
N.E.2d 642 (1962), both discussed in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.1. If the director 
fully discloses the opportunity to the board of directors beforehand, he may be 
protected. See, e.g., Black v. Parker Mfg. Co., 329 Mass. 105, 106 N.E.2d 544 (1952), 
discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.2. 
11246 Mass. 324, 141 N.E. 41 (1923). The trustees were given "full manage-
ment ... of the .•. shares, with the full ... right to vote ... and exercise as to 
the same any rights which an owner might exercise consistently with and subject 
to the terms hereof." The terms of the voting trust agreement in the Stone case 
are not reported, but are presumably similar. 
12 Ohio National Life Insurance Co. v. Struble, 82 Ohio App. 480, 483, 81 
N.E.2d 622, 624 (1948). Contra, Gottschlek v. Avalon Realty Co., 249 Wis. 78, 23 
N.W.2d 606 (1946). 
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such powers were not within the contemplation of the parties to the 
trust agreement. And as stated in American Jurisprudence Second, 
"the Courts appear unwilling ... to construe a grant of general powers 
to voting trustees as authorizing them to vote for destruction of a 
corporation or of the stockholders' interest therein."13 Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has definitely taken a contrary position, 
subject only to the limitation that this power cannot be exercised so 
as to further one's own interests to the detriment of others. 
§8.4. Pledge of voting trust certificates: Delivery. Although legal 
title may fail to pass to a transferee owing to the lack of indorsement, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has frequently held that the delivery of 
the stock constitutes transfer of equitable title.1 The same conclusion 
was reached under the now repealed Uniform Stock Transfer Act,2 
even under circumstances of non-compliance with the transfer pro-
visions of the act and even though the act purported to provide for 
the only methods of transfer.3 In Whitney v. Nolan4 the Court reached 
the same result involving a pledge of unindorsed shares of stock, and 
held that the pledgee was entitled to indorsement of the shares and 
even a stock dividend received after transfer of the equitable rights. 
The theory of these decisions is that a technical defect, such as the 
lack of indorsement, will not prevent transfer of equitable title when 
the facts show that the owner intended to transfer the stock. The Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act was construed as being inapplicable to the 
transfer of equitable title.5 
The most recent step in this area involved the recognition of an 
equitable pledge of voting trust certificates. The Court reached this 
result in Colbert v. Hennessey6 by strongly emphasizing the apparent 
intent of the pledgor. His stock had been delivered to the pledgee who 
in turn transferred it to a voting trust. The voting trust certificates 
were then issued to the pledgor, and were never delivered to the 
pledgee. However, on subsequent occasions, the pledgor referred to 
the certificates as being pledged. In effect, then, the Court must have 
been holding that the delivery of the stock was sufficient to transfer 
the equitable title to the subsequently issued voting trust certificates, 
this having been intended by the pledgor. 
1319 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, §696, p. 201 (1965). 
§8.4. 1 See, e.g., Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Adams, 224 Mass. 442, 
113 N.E. 277 (1916); Herbert v. Simson, 220 Mass. 480, 108 N.E. 65 (1915). Cf. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 300 Mass. 24, 13 N.E.2d 788 (1938). 
2G.L., c. 155, §§24-26, repealed by Acts of 1957, c. 765, §2 (effective Oct. 1, 
1958). See now G.L., c. 106, §8-101 et seq. 
8 G.L., c. 155, §27. See Edgerly v. First National Bank of Boston, 292 Mass. 181, 
197 N.E. 518 (1935). While Section 27 provided that legal title to stock was trans-
ferred only by delivery of indorsed certificates or delivery accompanied by a 
written assignment or power of attorney, the act did not bar transfer of the 
equitable title. 
4296 Mass. 419, 6 N.E.2d 386 (1937). 
5 See note 3 supra. 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997,217 N.E.2d 914, also noted in §§8.1 and 8.2 supra. The 
pertinent facts are noted in note 2, §8.1, supra. 
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Article 8 of the Unifonn Commercial Code, which replaced the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, provides in Section 8-307 that as between 
the transferor and transferee "a security in registered form" may be 
transferred by delivery without indorsement; and that the transferee 
shall have a specifically enforceable right to have any necessary in-
dorsement supplied.7 This provision applies to voting trust certificates 
because of the definition of "security" in Section 8-102.8 Since Section 
8-307 specifically adopts the Nolan-type decisions, the Code may pre-
clude continued judicial circumvention of the statute (as was the 
case under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act).9 Therefore, if the Code 
had been applicable to the pledge in Colbert, the Court might not have 
reached the same result owing to the absence of actual delivery. 
§8.5. Corporate resolutions: Waiver of stock transfer restriction. 
A broadly drafted corporate resolution in Colbert v. Hennessey1 al-
most produced an unanticipated result. The resolution was as follows: 
"To suspend the operation of the restrictions on the transfer of stock 
... to permit any original transfer made by ... Bowser [the deceased] 
... and the original transfer ... of any voting trust certificate ... 
issued in exchange for the ... stock .... "2 Literally interpreted the 
resolution waived all restrictions on the Bowser holdings. It was 
argued, therefore, that the stock under the private stockholder agree-
mentS was not subject to the corporation's first option. On its face the 
apparent intent was to give Bowser a free hand, with the other stock-
holders being bound to the restriction. The Court, however, held that 
the agreement constituted a relinquishment of his rights under the 
waiver. Since the resolution did not apply to the other parties to the 
agreement, the Court opined that the purpose of the agreement would 
have been nullified when two of the three were bound to offer the 
stock to the corporation. 
§8.6. Corporate name: Similarity and unfair competition. In 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts Life In-
surance CO.,1 the petitioner, Mass. Mutual, sought to enjoin Mass. Life 
from doing business under its name. Relief was prayed upon three 
7 G.L., c. 106, §8-307. The transferee will not become a bona fide purchaser 
until the indorsement is supplied, and once supplied, he becomes such only as 
of that time, not retroactively. As a bona fide purchaser he acquires the security 
free of any adverse claims, be they legal or equitable. See Section 8-301. 
8 See the definition of "security" in Section 8-102(1) (a) and (c), the definition 
of "issuer" in Section 8-201, the definition of "person" in Section 1-201, and finally 
see Comment 28 to Section 1-201 explaining "organization," all found in General 
Laws, Chapter 106. 
9 G.L., c. 106, §1-103, provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions 
of this chapter, the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement" the Code. 
See the fourth paragraph to the Code Comment, G.L., c. 106, §1-103 (1958). 
§8;5. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997, 217 N.E.2d 914, also noted in §§8.I, 8.2 and 
8,4 supra. 
2Id. at 1006,217 N.E.2d at 922. 
3 See discussion in text supported by notes 1-7, §8.I, supra. 
§8.6. 11966 Mass; Adv. Sh. 1161, 218 N.E.2d 564. 
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bases: common law equitable principles;2 General Laws, Chapter HO, 
Section 7A;3 and General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 9.4 The Supreme 
Judicial Court proceeded to clarify the distinction between these two 
statutory bases. Under Section 9 of Chapter 155, the State Secretary 
"considers only the abstract likelihood or possibility of one name 
being mistaken for another because of literal similarity, and a court 
acting under the same statute can do no more."5 Under Section 7A 
of Chapter 110, however, a court may proceed to determine "whether 
the location or the manner of the use of the name may result in 
'injury to business reputation or ... dilution of the distinctive quality 
of a trade name.' "6 An injunction can therefore be granted under 
Section 7A regardless of whether the names in the abstract appear so 
similar or alike as to be mistaken one for the other. 
In addition, Section 7 A is not intended as the exclusive prescription 
of remedies for unfair competition. The Court noted that Massachu-
setts decisions have indicated that the section is merely a supplement 
to the common law rights.7 Thus, the Court has reversed the apparent 
2 A common law remedy is available to "one whose trade name has acquired 
a secondary meaning in the minds of the public ... to prevent another from 
using the same name or a name so similar as to mislead the public into buying the 
defendant's goods in the belief that they ... [are] buying those of the plaintiff and 
from palming off his goods as those of the plaintiff to the injury of the latter." 
Monroe Stationers & Printers, Inc. v. Munroe Stationers, Inc., 332 Mass. 278, 280-
281, 124 N.E.2d 526, 527 (1955). 
3 This statutory provision deals with injunctive relief in certain cases of trade 
mark infringement or unfair competition and is known as the "anti-dilution" stat-
ute. It reads as follows: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of di-
lution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade mark shall be a ground 
for injunctive relief in cases of trade mark infringement or unfair competition 
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion 
as to the source of goods or services." 
The recent decision of Food Center, Inc. v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 356 F.2d 775 
(1st Cir. 1966), is typical of the complex situations arising under, and reflects the 
broad discretion available to a court under Section 7A. The District Court decision, 
242 F. Supp. 785 (D. Mass. 1965), is reported in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.9. 
4 This statutory provision deals with administrative approval of corporate 
names and concurrent judicial remedy. Part of the opinion in the Massachusetts 
Mutual case involves the interpretation of this section. In cases of insurance com-
panies the Commissioner of Insurance must give his approval but the Secretary 
of the Commonwealth retains the statutory control of such proceedings. Therefore, 
the Court held that the State Secretary was in error when he stated that he lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the protest of Massachusetts Mutual filed in regard to the 
name of Massachusetts Life. The hearing held by the Commissioner approving 
this name was a nullity. This conclusion was essential to Massachusetts Mutual. 
While the Court did not so hold, Massachusetts Mutual probably would have 
been bound to exhaust its administrative remedy by pursuing it to final determin-
ation; it had failed to do so. However, it is uncertain whether this failure would 
foreclose only the relief available under Section 9 or would affect the other two 
bases as well. 
51966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1161, 1168, 218 N.E.2d 564, 569. 
6Id. at 1168, 218 N.E.2d at 569-570. 
7 See, e.g., Great Scott Food Market, Inc. v. Sunderland Wonder, Inc., lI48 Mass. 
320. 323. 203 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1965); New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
v. National Merchandizing Corp., 335 Mass. 658, 665-666, 141 N.E.2d 702. 707-708 
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indication to the contrary in Skil Corp. v. Barnet.s Nonstatutory equi-
table relief is thus still available to a corporation to enjoin the use by 
a later organized corporation of a similar corporate name. 
The Massachusetts Mutual decision has made it clear that Chapter 
155, Section 9, should not be regarded as the exclusive remedy with 
respect of grievances surrounding a corporate name. This can be 
extremely important when the corporation protests a name through 
the administrative provision of Section 9, but fails to exhaust this 
remedy before seeking judicial relief.9 It is uncertain whether the 
Supreme Judicial Court would bar relief in such circumstances under 
Section 7 A as well. 
§8.7. Partnerships: Expulsion of partner and confiscation of in· 
terest. The Supreme Judicial Court has always taken the attitude that 
it will not sanction forfeitures or confiscations of an individual's in-
terests.1 In Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates,2 the Court stated 
that "a partner does not lose his rights in the accrued profits of a 
firm by reason of breaches of the partnership articles, whether or not 
committed in bad faith, although ... he will be subject to charges 
for all unexcused breaches in the final accounting."3 
This attitude is again reflected in the recent decision in Fisher v. 
Fisher.4 The partnership agreement provided that "in the event any 
partner wishes to withdraw ... his interest shall revert equally to the 
remaining partners." It also contained a similar provision in reference 
to death of a partner. The plaintiff, who was seeking dissolution and a 
partnership accounting, had failed to account to the partnership for 
moneys which he had received. The defendants contended that by 
breaching the partnership agreement, he had in effect withdrawn from 
the partnership, and that, therefore, .they were justified in expelling 
him from the partnership and claiming his interest therein. The 
Supreme Judicial Court, in rejecting the contention, stated that 
neither the agreement nor the Uniform Partnership Act5 contained a 
provision making breach equivalent to withdrawal. 
In reaching its decision in Fisher, the Court was faced with the 
equitable doctrine of "clean hands." Clearly, the plaintiff was guilty 
of improper conduct. The purpose of the doctrine, according to the 
(1957); Jays, Inc. v. Jay-Originals, Inc., 321 Mass. 737, 742, 75 N.E.2d 514, 516-
517 (1947); Healer v. Bloomberg Bros., Inc., 321 Mass. 476, 477-478, 73 N.E.2d 
895, 895-896 (1947). 
S 337 Mass. 485, 488-491, 150 N.E.2d 551, 553-556 (1958). 
9 Massachusetts Life argued the principle of failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. See note 4 supra. 
§8.7. 1 See, generally, Anderson Corp. v. Blanch, 340 Mass. 43, 50, 162 N.E.2d 
825, 830 (1959); Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 177 N.E.2d 287 (1954). For its 
application to partnerships, see Lavoine v. Casey, 251 Mass. 124, 127, 146 N.E. 
241, 242 (1925); Harvey v. Varney, 104 Mass. 436, 444 (1870). 
2321 Mass. 57, 71 N.E.2d 580 (1947). 
3Id. at 64, 71 N.E.2d at 585. 
4349 Mass. 675, 212 N.E.2d 222 (1965). 
1\ G.L., c. IOSA. 
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Court, "is to prevent a party from benefiting by his dishonesty." It 
then remarked that "the plaintiff's claims do not arise out of his im-
proper conduct."6 The decision therefore clarifies any dictum to the 
contrary in Ferrick v. Barry7 that an improperly acting partner would 
be barred from seeking equitable relief. 
In trying to reach an equitable basis for an accounting, the Court 
found that the plaintiff's conduct was sufficient ground for the other 
partners to seek a dissolution under General Laws, Chapter I08A, 
Section 32(I)(d).8 However, in suspending the plaintiff and dividing 
his interest among them, the defendants' own actions also constituted 
a breach, thereby giving the plaintiff ground to seek a decree of 
dissolution. When equity and the furtherance of justice so require,9 
the Supreme Judicial Court held, a partnership may be dissolved under 
Section 32 as of a date earlier than the decree of dissolution. Such a 
decree may be entered nunc pro tunc. lO Therefore, while the conduct 
of the defendants constituted the ground for dissolution, the conduct 
of the plaintiff determined the date of the dissolution. 
The General Laws provide in Chapter I08A, Section 31(1)(d), that 
dissolution is automatically caused "without violation of the agree-
ment ... (d) by the expulsion of any partner from the business bona 
fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement be-
tween partners." This section was discussed in Kurtzon v. Kurtzon,ll 
an Illinois decision, wherein the court stated that "the enumeration 
in this section of causes of rightful dissolution ... precludes dissolution 
for any other cause, such as partner's withdrawal, not included in such 
enumeration." The Fisher agreement covered withdrawal but failed 
to provide for expulsion. 
The probably unfortunate aspect of the Fisher case is that it allows 
a partner to avoid forfeiture of his interest by improper conduct when 
such a forfeiture may have been the original intention of the partners. 
As previously noted, the agreement provided for retention of interest 
in event of withdrawal or death. It also prohibited sale or assignment 
of interests without consent. The business was a family one. Appar-
ently, as happens in the formation of many partnerships, no thought 
may have been given to possible bad faith by any partner and the 
agreement therefore did not provide for such a situation. Neverthe-
6349 Mass. 675, 677, 212 N.E.2d 222, 224 (1965). 
7320 Mass. 217, 223, 68 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1946). 
8 The statute reads as follows: "On application by or for a partner the court 
shall decree a dissolution whenever: ... (d) A partner wilfully or persistently 
commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts him-
self in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him." 
9 G.L., c. 211, §3. 
10 Judgment nunc pro tunc is provided for in G.L., c. 235, §4. For a discussion 
thereof, see Miller v. Emergency Housing Commn., 330 Mass. 693, 116 N.E.2d 663 
(1954); Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 392, 114 N.E. 713 (1917). 
11 339 Ill. API:>. 431, 90 N.E.2d 245 (1950). 
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less, while the clear intent may have been defeated, Fisher v. Fisher, 
based on partnership law, is sound. 
§8.8. Partnerships: Wrongful dissolution and damages for breach 
of agreement. General Laws, Chapter 108A, Section 38(2), provides: 
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partner-
ship agreement the rights of the partners shall be as follows: 
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully 
shall have ... 
II. The right, as against each partner who has caused the dis-
solution wrongfully, to damages for breach of the agreement. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
In Fisher v. Fisher,1 the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the plain-
tiff "is entitled to receive from the partnership such sums as may be 
determined to be due him ... in accordance with ... §38."2 In not 
referring to the specific subsection in Section 38, it is uncertain whether 
the Court would hold that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. It had 
held that the defendants were guilty of wrongful action. The answer 
may be found in the opinion itself since the Court stated "from the 
partnership." Damages are not payable from the partnership; they 
are recoverable against the particular partner. 
Are damages available under Section 38(2)(a)(II) when dissolution 
is decreed under Section 32(1)(d)?3 Subsection 38(2) is predicated upon 
dissolution caused "in contravention of the partnership agreement." 
This language is found only in Section 31 which states that 
Dissolution is caused: ... 
(2) In contravention of the agreement ... where circumstances 
do not permit a dissolution under any other provision in this sec-
tion, by the express will of any partner at any time; ... 
(6) By decree of court under section thirty-two. 
A reading of Sections 31(1), 31(2), 31(6), 32 and 38(2)(a) together pro-
duces a literal but illogical proposition that damages may be assessed 
in those instances where there has been a "wrongful" dissolution of 
the partnership only when such dissolution is caused in contravention 
of the agreement pursuant to Section 31(2). This interpretation leads 
to the anomalous situation in which damages cannot be assessed for 
intentional misconduct. 
This proposition has been refuted in a California decision, Zeibak 
v. Nasser.4 In this case the partnership was to terminate upon incor-
poration of the business, and the plaintiff wrongfully refused to ex-
§8.8. 1349 Mass. 675, 212 N.E.2d 222 (1965). See text supported by notes 4-10, 
§8.7, supra, for additional discussion of this case. 
2Id. at 678, 212 N.E.2d at 224 (emphasis added). 
3 See note 8, §8.7, supra. 
412 Cal. 2d 1, 12·15, 82 P.2d 375, 381-382 (1938). Ferrick v. Barry, 320 Mass. 
217,222,68 N.E.2d 690, 694-695 (1946), may be in agreement. Cf. Shulkin v. Shulkin, 
301 Mass. 184, 191-192, 16 N.E.2d 644, 650·651 (1938). 
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ecute the agreement required for incorporation. The court held that 
"although the actual dissolution was effected by decree of court, never-
theless such dissolution was caused by the wrongful conduct of plain-
tiff 'in contravention of the partnership agreement' within section 38." 
The court, in its decision, did note that the trier of fact had found 
that the plaintiff's conduct was in contravention of the agreement and 
that dissolution was decreed because of wrongful conduct. 
The best answer is found in a New York decision, Schnitzer v. 
Josephthal. 5 "1£ the partner bringing about a dissolution would have 
been able to secure a dissolution by decree of court, because of the 
other partner's breach of his agreement, the latter is not entitled to 
damages." He can only claim what was rightfully his at the time of ex-
pulsion; and the court added, he must show his own substantial per-
formance of essential conditions in his claim for damages for breach. 
A decision to the contrary would result in a partner benefiting by his 
dishonesty. The doctrine of "clean hands" could then apply to bar 
relief for that partner.6 
Intentional activities by a partner in Johnson v. Kennedy7 were 
not wrongful; therefore his other partners were merely entitled to 
an equal share in the assets and were not entitled to their share of 
the fair value of the business (damages). The case involved a bill in 
equity for an accounting and damages. An insurance partnership was 
formed under an oral agreement which was silent as to duration. 
After a few years the defendant partner secretly withdrew all of the 
firm's cash, records and furniture, and established his own insurance 
business. "However unseemly in manner and method," the Court 
stated, his termination was not a legal wrong.s Under General Laws, 
Chapter I08A, Section 31(1)(b), dissolution is caused without violation 
of the agreement "by the express will of any partner when no definite 
term ... is specified." 
Since dissolution is automatic under Section 31(1), the date of dis-
solution was that of the defendant's acts. According to the facts as 
reported he used all the assets thereafter in his own business and re-
tained the same business name until changed four months later. The 
Supreme Judicial Court has held that profits made by the remaining 
partners (the defendant) subsequent to dissolution, through the em-
ployment of partnership assets, must be accounted for to the partner 
who has retired and has not been paid his share of the assets.9 Thus, in 
5 122 Misc. 15, 202 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1923), aD'd, 208 App. Div. 769, 202 N.Y. 
Supp. 952 (1924). 
6 This doctrine was not applicable in the Fisher case, 349 Mass. 675, 212 N.E.2d 
222 (1965), see §8.7 supra, since the plaintiff's claim did not arise out of his 
improper conduct. 
7350 Mass. 294, 214 N.E.2d 276 (1966). 
S See Murray v. Bateman, 315 Mass. 113, 115, 51 N.E.2d 954, 955·956 (1943); 
Steele v. Estabrook, 232 Mass. 432, 439, 122 N.E. 562, 564·565 (1919). Cf. Page v. 
Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41 (1961), discussed in note 11 infra. 
9 See, e.g., Shelly v. Smith, 271 Mass. 106, 170 N.E. 826 (1930); Steele v. Esta· 
brook, 232 Mass. 432, 170 N.E. 826 (1919); Moore v. Rawson, 185 Mass. 264, 70 
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Steele v. Estabrook10 the Court stated that "in as much as the interest 
of the plaintiff in the partnership property ... was wrongfully used 
by the defendants . . . in carrying on the same kind of business as 
that which had been carried on by the partnership before it came to 
an end, the plaintiff was entitled to the profits which his [interest] 
earned in the business thereafter carried on." Apparently, in the 
Johnson case, the plaintiffs failed to establish these profitsll or, con-
versely, the Court may have felt that they were not entitled to any 
profits.12 
§8.9. Partnerships: Joint ventures. Massachusetts has continuously 
recognized joint ventures even though founded merely on an oral 
basis.1 However, recognition alone has not solved the difficulty of 
suitably enforcing the venture. Lawless v. Melone2 represents such 
recognition but more importantly, it may suggest an equitable alter-
native to enforcing a personal relationship. Lawless sought specific 
performance of an oral agreement in order to obtain 50 per cent of the 
corporation which was formed under the venture. In denying specific 
performance, the Superior Court awarded him damages based upon 
the asset value of the corporation. The Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed the final decree and ordered further proceedings but only upon 
the issue of damages. The Court felt that the issue should have been 
the fair value of the promised stock interest as of the date of demand, 
i.e., the value of his lost opportunity. 
In a footnote the Court cited Air Technology Corp. v. General 
Electric Co.,s wherein it had held that "whatever may be the difficul-
N.E. 64 (1904); Jepson v. Killian, 151 Mass. 593, 24 N.E. 856 (1890); Robinson v. 
Simmons, 146 Mass. 167, 15 N.E. 558 (1888); Freeman v. Freeman, 142 Mass. 98, 
7 N.E. 710 (1886). 
10232 Mass. 432, 122 N.E. 562 (1919). 
11 This burden can be a difficult one since profits must be established with 
certainty. See Murray v. Bateman, 315 Mass. II3, II5-II6, 51 N.E.2d 954, 955-956 
(1943). In Whitman v. Jones, 322 Mass. 340, 343, 77 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1948), the 
Court stated that a partner appropriating good will to his own use must account 
for its value. However, in the Johnson case, the Court was of the opinion that 
there was no good will since it remarked that the partnership was not to be a 
continuing enterprise. California has taken a different approach. "A partner at will 
who, in bad faith and in violation of his fiduciary duties, dissolves the partner-
ship in an attempt to appropriate to his own use the new prosperity of the 
partnership without adequate compensation to a copartner is liable for violation 
of an implied agreement not to exclude copartners wrongfully from the partner-
ship business opportunity." Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 197-198, 359 P.2d 41, 
45 (1961). 
12 The Court stated that the plaintiffs are still in the insurance business; that 
all the ex-partners now have customers who formerly did business with the part-
nership; and that none of the ex-partners now uses the former partnership name. 
§8.9. 1 See, e.g., Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 
537 (1950). The joint venture differs from a partnership in that it is ordinarily 
limited to a particular enterprise whereas a partnership is usually formed for 
the transaction of a general business. 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 463, 214 N.E.2d 881. 
3347 Mass. 613, 628-629, 199 N.E.2d 538, 549·550 (1964). 
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ties in proving damages, . . . recovery cannot be less than the higher 
of ... the value reasonably expended by [plaintiff] ... in the perform-
ance of the joint arrangement,4 [or] ... the fair value of [his] ... 
contribution to that arrangement."5 As emphasized by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in both decisions the court must appraise the fair value 
of the lost opportunity in light of the uncertainties. Therefore, in 
Lawless, the Superior Court should have considered the corporation 
"with no past record of earnings and only a speculative, experimental, 
and uncertain future;" and in Air Technology, "the probability of 
successful negotiations and Air Force approval" and the approximate 
realized amounts from anticipated contracts should have been con-
sidered. Naturally, consideration would probably not produce all 
that was expected by Lawless from stock ownership. However, a more 
equitable basis for recovery is thereby available especially since only 
"a reasonable approximation will suffice."6 This is particularly so 
"where the difficulties in determining damages arise in large part from 
[defendant'S] ... own failure ... [to perform] in accordance with the 
joint undertaking."7 Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the 
redetermination of damages ordered in the Lawless case cannot law-
fully result in a lesser recovery since the Superior Court had held that 
the damages awarded were also equivalent to the fair value of the 
services performed for the defendants by Lawless.8 
The oral joint venture arrangement carries with it the same re-
sponsibilities as the written. "While the enterprise continues, joint 
venturers, like partners, owe to one another the utmost good faith 
and loyalty."9 Therefore, if during the existence of the relationship, 
one member acquires property for himself that he was under a duty 
to obtain for the enterprise, courts will impose a constructive trust. lO 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated in Barry v. Covich ll that a trust 
will be imposed "where there has been the wrongful use of informa-
tion confidentially given to one for a particular purpose and where 
4 See, as to the remedy of recovery of reasonably incurred expenses, Robie v. 
Ofgant, 306 F.2d 656, 660-661 (1st Cir. 1962); Lynch v. Culhane, 237 Mass. 172, 
174, 129 N.E. 717, 717-718 (1921); Corbin, Contracts §1031 (1964 Replacement). 
5347 Mass. 613, 628·629, 199 N.E.2d 538, 549 (1964). See, as to this restitutional 
measure of damages (quantum meruit), Cygan v. Megathlin, 326 Mass. 732, 736, 
96 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1951). Cf. United States v. Americo Construction Co., 168 
F. Supp. 760, 761·762 (D. Mass. 1958); Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16, 23, 20 
N.E.2d 471, 475 (1939); Murphy v. Mitchell, 254 Mass. 18, 21, 149 N.E. 603, 604 
(1925). 
6347 Mass. 613, 627, 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (1964). 
7 Ibid. See Noble v. Joseph Burnett Co., 208 Mass. 75, 82, 94 N.E. 289, 289-290 
(1911) (a fair and equitable share of the net profits not too indefinite as a basis 
for an accounting). See also all the cases cited by the Court at 347 Mass. 613, 627, 
199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (1964). 
81966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 463, 464, 214 N.E.2d 881, 882. 
9 Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226, 233, 93 N.E.2d 537, 541 
(1950). 
10 See, e.g., Cann v. Barry, 293 Mass. 313, 199 N.E. 905 (1936); Rolikatis v. 
Lovett, 213 Mass. 545, 548, 100 N.E. 748, 749 (1913). 
11 332 Mass. 338, 343, 124 N.E.2d 921, 924 (1955). 
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instead it has been employed for an entirely different purpose to the 
gain of the one receiving the information and the detriment of the 
other." This was apparently the case in the recent decision of DeCotis 
v. D'Antona.12 No trust was imposed, however, since on the facts the 
joint venture had terminated prior to the property acquisition. 
§8.10. New Business Corporation Law: Amendments. The new 
Business Corporation Law,l which became effective on October I, 
1965, was the subject of two minor amendments during the 1966 
SURVEY year. The State Secretary, by amendment to Section 107 of 
General Laws, Chapter 156B, must send notice of dissolution to the 
corporation at its last address as appearing in his records.2 Prior to 
the amendment, the notice was sent to the person last shown to be 
serving as clerk of the corporation. 
Filing fees for articles of amendment are now set at $25 for each 
amendment, under the revised Section 114(b)(5) of General Laws, 
Chapter 156B.3 
12350 Mass. 165, 214 N.E.2d 21 (1966). 
§8.l0. 1 G.L., c. 156B, adopted by Acts of 1964, c. 723, discussed in detail in 
1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law c. 1. 
2 Acts of 1966, c. 347, §1. 
3Id. §2. 
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